Singapore, LOKPAL BILL

In 1982, In Singapore, LOKPAL BILL was implemented and 142 Corrupt Ministers & Officers were arrested in one single day.. Today Singapore has only 1% poor people & no taxes are paid by the people to the government, 92% Literacy Rate, Better Medical Facilities, Cheaper Prices, 90% Money is white & Only 1% Unemployment exists.. 

Singapore’s CPIB: the Investigative Model

Corruption was commonplace in Singapore throughout its colonial history. When police inspectors stole 1,800 tons of narcotics during the 1950s, Crown administrators passed the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance and established the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).¹¹ This ordinance was intended to signal investors that the administration in Singapore would not tolerate corruption. However, enforcement was spotty, the CPIB weak, and Singapore kept its reputation for freewheeling and corrupt capitalism. In response, in the 1970s, Singapore reorganized the CPIB and gave it considerable powers to curb endemic corruption. The reorganized CPIB concentrated its activities on investigation and enforcement. Evidence of the CPIB’s success in reducing corruption is present from Singapore’s highly favorable investment climate that “typically ranks among the top twenty recipients of foreign investment in the world in absolute terms.”¹² This success in attracting investments attests to that government’s ability to overcome the perverse effects of reputation in the persistence of corrupt behavior.¹³

A capacity to reverse reputational costs is all the more remarkable given Singapore’s history. In 1959, the British granted Singapore autonomy from Malaysia and independence followed shortly thereafter. At independence, the People’s Action Party implemented a set of reforms to regulate citizens’ behavior and impose strict punishments for corrupt practices.¹⁴ The PAP Government recognized that a credible commitment to fighting corruption was essential to attract investors to Singapore and build an environment conducive to economic growth. Hence, it declared a set of reforms to deter potentially corrupt officials and attract foreign investors. Despite the proclaimed reforms, corruption continued to be a serious problem in Singapore into the mid-1970s when another series of scandals again implicated police officials in the narcotic trade.

These scandals prompted the government of Lee Kwan Yew to strengthen laws and revamp the CPIB to end venality in Singapore’s public sector. The CPIB was devoted entirely to the investigation of corrupt acts and the preparation of evidence for prosecution. Since the 1970s, it has grown from nine investigators to its present staff of over 75 law enforcement professionals.¹⁵ Indeed, corruption in Singapore has been reduced to levels that rival the Scandinavian countries.

The CPIB derives its power from legislation that grants it remarkable discretion. First, the 1960 Prevention of Corruption Ordinance gave it a mandate to investigate allegations of corruption and prepare cases for prosecution. This original ordinance has been amended seven times and renamed the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241 of the Statutes of Singapore). The 1989 Confiscation of Benefits Act expanded government powers to seize assets of civil servants accused and convicted of taking bribes. This legislation prohibits illegal payments as well as the solicitation and acceptance of bribes. Later, the Confiscation of Benefits Act was strengthened and renamed the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act of 1999.¹⁶ These acts give the CPIB discretion to seize assets and establish the preconditions wherein an individual convicted of corruption is punished by lengthy prison terms and substantial fines.

Among the CPIB’s unique characteristics are its small size, narrow police emphasis, and service to a semi-authoritarian regime. With only 75 staff members, the CPIB lacks the presence of Hong Kong’s ICAC, and it has accordingly a narrow investigative function. The CPIB has relied on deterrent strategies; for example, a conviction for corruption may carry a $100,000.00 fine and up to five years in prison.¹⁷ Finally, the CPIB was an effective support of Lee Kwan Yew’s semi-authoritarian regime that made economic growth its primary policy objective. Indeed, the fact that Singapore has been ruled by a semi-authoritarian regime since independence renders this commitment and threat of punishment more credible.

The organization of Singapore’s CPIB is a strict hierarchy. At the top is the President who receives all reports and may act as the final arbiter of whether the CPIB takes action against alleged corruption. Below the President are the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Directors, and special investigators of the CPIB. Reports are sent up the hierarchy from the investigative branches of the agency to the President. The CPIB’s relatively narrow functions account for fewer employees and a high rate of successful investigations leading to conviction.

Fighting corruption is contentious and Singapore’s political leadership encountered resistance when seeking an appropriate ministerial location for the CPIB. Between 1955 and 1970, the CPIB reported to four different ministries demonstrating the difficulty implementing a meaningful set of reforms to combat corruption.¹⁸ Although the agency has moved from ministry to ministry since being established, its present location in the Executive branch has endowed it with a great deal of influence. The CPIB is now an integral component of an apparatus of state agencies with a mandate to reduce corruption in public and private life alike in Singapore.

Whereas some observers argue that putting the CPIB directly in the Executive branch indicates a high level of commitment on the part of Singapore’s political leadership, it might also be seen as part of the structure of semi- authoritarian rule.¹⁹ Its reporting hierarchy reinforces the executive’s influence while reducing the CPIB’s independence. Indeed, countervailing measures that might control the CPIB, or at a minimum place some constraints through oversight mechanisms, are absent. This lack of accountability of a police function is consistent with the semi-authoritarian nature of Singapore’s government.

A litmus test to assess an anti-corruption commission’s accountability might be the activities of oversight bodies. In Singapore, oversight mechanisms are less clearly defined with the CPIB than in Hong Kong’s ICAC. The CPIB reports to an Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee that reports directly to the President. However, since the CPIB was established, public sector corruption has declined with each consecutive year. One commentator has noted that while legislation may not have eliminated corruption, it “is a fact of life rather than a way of life. Put differently, corruption exists in Singapore, but not a corrupt society.”²⁰

Singapore is a special case since its anti-corruption commission created a climate conducive for international investments while its citizens live under a semi -authoritarian regime that in some circumstances would be inimical to high levels of economic growth. Despite the centralization of power, the CPIB demonstrates that a government’s commitment to combating corruption is critical for meaningful reform. In Singapore, this commitment firstly signaled domestic constituents that corruption would not be tolerated, and secondly, international investors receive assurances that their investments were secure. However, what is crucial about this type of agency is that it operates without the accountability constraints active in a democratic polity. Absent are the committee systems and multiple reporting mechanisms that work in Hong Kong. Although it would be an error to attribute the extent of foreign investment to the CPIB, it is part of an overall picture of stable property rights and rapid economic growth that has come at a high cost to political freedom.

Hiring & Retaining

• Consider your employees before your customers.  Not only will the employee put out a far better performance due to feeling respected, but your company will also build a reputation as being “the company to work for”, which will attract other, good employees.

• Be flexible. Constraints in the office constrain creativity and work performance. Go for casual clothing, if possible. Let your employee decide when it’s time to eat and take a break. Be flexible on your employee’s schedule, catering to his or her personal needs. The employee will show appreciation in return, by supplying a good output of production.

• Hire nice people. Not one customer in the world, no matter what business you are in, enjoys service from someone with less-than-appreciative attitude. And, your other employees will not enjoy working with them either, bringing down moral and production drastically. This kind of person will not be willing to strive at contributing to your company; they will strive to contribute only to themselves.

• Consider the unconventional when interviewing an employee. The more often you can set a scenario that a potential employee will not expect or could find to be an unusual method of interviewing, the better. It will give you a chance to see what that person is really capable of, as a person.

• Let your employee job hop and provide an opportunity to let them do it within your company, instead of having to go outside the company. More than likely, if they can’t do it in the company, they will venture outside to a place that they can. Take advantage of the multiple skills your people can learn within the company. This not only helps your company out, it gives the employee a feeling of more purpose and he or she will enjoy not having to go far to expand their skills.

• Keep your people in mind when it comes to information on where the company is headed and what it is doing. If the employee does not feel informed on what is happening, they will not feel as though they are part of the company and, therefore, will not want to stay, in the long run.

• Get to know what your people want, when they first enter the organization and periodically throughout their tenure. People’s motives and desires change. The good employer is the one that can keep up with those changes. Offer feedback methods and make sure you act on the results.

Above all, remember what it was that got you that good employee in the first place. The concepts mentioned in this article that enable an employer to attain a good employee to begin with are basically the same principals of retaining them as well. It’s that simple. Anyone who works for a company that considers their needs, is just, and can remain flexible, as well as provides other good employees to work alongside, will want to continue working in that company. Hiring and retaining good employees goes hand in hand.